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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CPLR 302(a)(1): Execution of indemnity agreement in New Jersey by
non-domiciliary not a "transaction of business" in New York even
though performance by subcontractor was to take place in New York.
Although a non-domiciliary need not be physically present in New
York in order to be subject to in personam jurisdiction under CPLR
302(a)(1), 22 the courts have traditionally attached great importance to
such physical presence. 23 Furthermore, if the case involves a contract,
strong emphasis will also be placed upon the importance of the place
where the contract was executed.24 Indeed, where the defendant has not
entered the state and the contract was executed without the state, it
may prove extremely difficult to secure jurisdiction over the defendant
even though he derives a substantial benefit from a contract that is to
be performed in New York.
As noted by one authority,25 this restrictive approach may be
attributable to the fear that foreign jurisdictions will otherwise retaliate
by increasing their jurisdictional bases.26 Whatever their motives, how-
ever, the lower courts continue to interpret CPLR 302(a)(1) in the
conservative fashion evidenced by the holding of the Appellate Divi-
sion, First Department, in Ferrante Equipment Co. v. Lasker-Goldman
Corp.27
In Ferrante, the defendant's surety (the fourth-party plaintiff)
sought indemnification on its performance bond pursuant to the in-
demnity agreement between it and the fourth-party individual de-
fendant (hereinafter Ferrante) after the defendant had defaulted in its
performance. The indemnification agreement had been executed in
New Jersey, and Ferrante had apparently not entered New York for
any purposes related to the agreement. However, the agreement covered
work to be performed in New York, and Ferrante most likely derived
"commercial benefits" from the contract. It should also be noted that
While CPLR 302 expanded the circumstances in which in personam jurisdiction
might be obtained, its effect is limited only to the situations enumerated therein,
and matrimonial actions are not included. It being conceded that the respondent
has a bona fide domicile in the State of Florida, CPLR 202 is inapplicable to
permit the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the respondent.
22 See Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
2 3 E.g., Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, 21 App. Div. 2d 474, 251
N.Y.S.2d 740 (1st Dep't 1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965);
Greenberg v. R.S.P. Realty Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 182, 250 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County), rev'd, 22 App. Div. 2d 690, 253 N.Y.S.2d 344 (2d Dep't 1964). See generally 7B
MCKINNEY'S CPLR 302, supp. commentary 113, 115 (1965); 1 WNsTEIN, KoaN & MLLER,
NEW YoRK Civm PRAcrimc 302.06a (1968).
24 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302, supp. commentary 113, 117 (1965).
25 7B MCKINNEY's CPLR 302, supp. commentary 108 (1966).
26 Cf. A. Millner Co. v. Noudar LDA, 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 329, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289, 294
(1st Dep't 1966).
27 31 App. Div. 2d 355, 297 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Ist Dep't 1969).
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the defendant never would have obtained the performance bond in the
absence of Ferrante's assurances. Moreover, Ferrante insisted that partial
payment checks were to be made payable to him and the defendant
jointly. The court nevertheless held that these facts were insufficient to
sustain jurisdiction over him.
Justice McNally, in a strong dissent,28 argued for a more liberal
construction of CPLR 302; one that would take full advantage of the
Supreme Court's decisons in International Shoe Co. v. Washington29
and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.30 without offending the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause. The dissent believed that
Ferrante's activities, including those prior to and those subsequent to
the execution of the performance bond and indemnity agreement, "in
their entirety and in combination more than meet the statutory test of
his transaction of business in New York. ' 13
Few transactions of business would seem more purposefully con-
nected with New York than the execution of an indemnity agreement
for work to be performed in New York.32 However, it appears that the
first department has chosen to cling to the relatively safe jurisdictional
nexuses of physical presence and domestic execution of a contract
rather than venture forth on a jurisdictional limb which is strong
enough to bear the additional weight without breaking.
CPLR 302(a)(1): Retention of New York attorney is "transaction of
business" within the state if defendant authorized institution of New
York action.
Non-domiciliaries may subject themselves to the in personam juris-
diction of New York courts by transacting business in the state in
person or through an agent.33 Therefore, when the plaintiff in an action
is employed by a non-domiciliary defendant, and the cause of action
arises from the employment, the nature of the relationship may well
prove determinative. Where the plaintiff is an agent, his acts in New
28 Id. at 356, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 987 (dissenting opinion).
20 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
30 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
3131 App. Div. 2d at 358, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
32 Cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13 (1969):
(3) If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Minnesota to
be performed in whole or in part by either party in Minnesota ... such [act]
shall be deemed to be doing business in Minnesota by the foreign corporation
and shall be deemed equivalent to th pointmnt te foreign corporation
of the secretary of the State of Minnesota and his successors to be its true and
lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process in any actions orproceedings against the f reign corporation arising from r growing out of uch
contract ....
3 CPLR 302(a)(1).
1969]
